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I. INTRODUCTION

Kessler Wilkerson was only two years old on the morning of
October 16, 1976.1 At approximately 10:30 a.m., neighbors heard loud
noises emanating from inside the Wilkerson trailer, alongside the
sound of Kessler's crying and his father's screams. 2 Two hours later,
the now-quiet father delivered his two-year-old son to the emergency
medical technicians. Despite their attempts to resuscitate the boy en
3
route to the hospital, Kessler was pronounced dead on arrival.
Discoveries in the hours and days that followed made Kessler's
death even worse. Kessler's autopsy revealed "multiple bruises all
over the child's body and.., significant bleeding and a deep laceration
of the liver," which resulted in his death. 4 Testimony after the fact
revealed that Kessler's father Kenneth Wilkerson repeatedly kicked
him, whipped him with a belt, and tied up Kessler in order to "bring
him up to be a man."5 What makes Kessler's death so tragic was that
it came at the hands of his father's "repeated beatings witnessed by
others who did not know abuse when they saw it, and who never
bothered to report" the abuse. 6 By the time anyone paid attention, it
was too late. Kessler was too young to call out for help, leaving the
state unaware of the abuse and unable to intervene.
Unfortunately, tragic results can also ensue from an
investigation of a child abuse allegation. Jochebed Good was just

1.
State v. Wilkerson, 247 S.E. 905, 907 (N.C. 1978).
2.
Id.
3.
Id.
4.
Id.
5.
Id. at 908.
6.
Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Storming the Castle to Save the Children: The Ironic Costs
of a Child Welfare Exception to the FourthAmendment, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 413, 531 (2005).
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seven years old on the night of April 24, 1987. 7 Armed with an
anonymous tip, state social services caseworker W.N. Hooper and a
female police officer drove to the Good household to investigate
allegations of child abuse. 8 At 10 p.m., Jochebed's mother Sandra
answered a "very loud pounding' at the door. 9 Sandra, feeling
compelled to do so, reluctantly allowed Hooper and the officer into her
home. 10 After talking with Sandra Good, Hooper allegedly chased a
frightened Jochebed around the house. Hooper proceeded to order the
policewoman to conduct a strip search of Jochebed under his
supervision, despite a lack of any evidence suggesting abuse. 1 Finding
no evidence of marks, injury, or abuse, Hooper and the officer left
Jochebed and her mother "shocked and shaken, deeply upset and
worried." 12 Jochebed, a child who showed no signs of abuse, was forced
to endure the frightening and humiliating experience of an invasive
strip search on the basis of an anonymous call and an agency afraid of
another child falling through the cracks.
The investigation of the Goods and the death of Kessler only
begin to shed light on the nightmare created by the pervasive problem
of child abuse in the United States. Child protective services ("CPS")
agencies often face the difficult task of walking the fine line between
protecting the child from abuse and preserving familial privacy.
Included in this familial privacy consideration is the privacy of the
child from intrusive and potentially traumatic searches. What makes
this task more difficult is the federal judiciary's lack of guidance in
determining the Fourth Amendment protections that bind CPS
investigations. The states and the federal circuits must answer the
following question: When child welfare officials are investigating
allegations of abuse and neglect, are they bound by the probable cause
and warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment, or can a court
loosen the Fourth Amendment requirements for the state and its
actors? Specifically, do the searches qualify for the "special needs
doctrine," an exception to the Fourth Amendment where a court
replaces traditional warrant and probable cause requirements with a
two-step test considering whether the search and seizure was

7.
1989).
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Good v. Dauphin Cnty. Soc. Servs. for Children & Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1089 (3d Cir.
Id.
Id. at 1089-90.
Id. at 1090.
Id.
Id.
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conducted to meet a state's "special need" and whether the search was
reasonable in light of the individual privacy interests and the
government's goals? 13 Furthermore, if the special needs doctrine
applies, when and how does it apply?
Currently, the federal circuits appear to be divided in a threeway circuit split when answering that question, but this Note will
show that circuit split is an illusion. 14 Through a series of cases
involving a variety of investigatory techniques, this complicated web
of opinions from the federal circuits creates more questions than
answers in the realm of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Factual
differences and a complicated balancing test involving state, parent,
and child interests make the courts' job difficult. Although many of the
decisions rely on the same logic and recognize the same privacy and
state interests, factual differences between the cases produce different
outcomes. These factual differences create the illusion that the circuits
are divided, despite their ideological similarities.
Moreover, the courts' tentative case-by-case approach to
deciding the special needs question has left the states with little
guidance in shaping their CPS policies. Over the years, CPS agencies
across the nation have created a wide range of policies and procedures
that vary in scope and intrusiveness. These procedural differences
often influence how a court will determine whether the CPS has
violated the Fourth Amendment. Because the circuits are responding
reactively to the special needs question, their decisions oftentimes
only cover a small subset of agency policies. In essence, CPS is flying
blindly, hoping that the courts will find their policies satisfactory
under the Fourth Amendment.
The web of competing interests between the state, parents, and
child, in conjunction with the appearance of a circuit split, has drawn
the attention of the Supreme Court. Just last term, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Camretta v. Greene, a case involving an in15
school warrantless interview of a suspected child abuse victim.
Despite the Court's desire to address the issue, reuniting the circuits
will have to wait for another day. The Court dismissed the case,
6
finding the case-in-controversy moot.1

13. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726-27 (1987); see also Jordan C. Budd, Pledge
Your Body for Your Bread: Welfare, Drug Testing, and the Inferior Fourth Amendment, 19 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 751, 793 (2011).

14.
15.
16.

See infra Part III.
Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2027-28 (2011).
Id. at 2026.
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This Note, however, argues that the appearance of a circuit
split is nothing but a figment of judicial imagination. Like shadows
resembling monsters, the case-by-case approach adopted by the
circuits to address the special needs question has created the illusion
of a circuit split. But when light is cast upon the circuit opinions
collectively, the illusion of the split, like the shadowy monster,
disappears. What is left is not a circuit split but a unified and welldeveloped special needs doctrine.
This Note will demonstrate that the circuits are not split as
follows: Part II focuses on the evolution of the special needs doctrine
and the lack of guidance the Supreme Court has provided to the lower
courts in defining what constitutes a "special need." It also discusses
the current state of child abuse in the United States and how the
states are attempting to combat the problem. Part III examines the
illusion of a three-way circuit split on the special needs doctrine's
application to child abuse cases. Part IV explains how the circuits are
actually applying a unified interpretation of the law. Finally, Part V
argues that the circuits should acknowledge the unified and detailed
special needs analysis created by the circuits' own opinions.
II. SPECIAL NEEDS AND THE CHILD ABUSE PROBLEM
The Supreme Court's lack of guidance on the issue of special
needs creates confusion in the lower courts on the doctrine's
application to child abuse investigations. Over the past twenty-six
years, the Supreme Court has had several opportunities to define
what constitutes a special need, yet the Court has merely given the
circuits a list of seemingly related cases as examples of when the
doctrine can be used. As a result, the lower courts have been left to
their own devices to attempt to define a special need.
The Fourth Amendment provides that "except in certain
carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without
proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a
valid search warrant."1 7 The special needs doctrine is one of those
carefully defined classes of cases. Justice Blackmun's concurring
opinion in New Jersey v. T.L.O. established the special needs
doctrine.18 There he explained that "[o]nly in those exceptional
circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement
17.
18.

Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967).
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of
interests for that of the Framers." 19 The creation of the special needs
doctrine affirmed a trend that began with the administrative search
doctrine nearly twenty years earlier. 20 With the creation of the special
needs doctrine arose a new standard of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. This new standard replaced probable cause with a
balancing of the state's interests in the search against the individual's
21
right to privacy.
While the modern special needs doctrine is a vital tool to the
state in achieving goals that would have been frustrated by a strict
Fourth Amendment approach, the test's flexibility has come with a
considerable cost. Specifically, the Supreme Court's lack of guidance
and the expansiveness of the doctrine's balancing test have led to
application problems in the lower courts. 22 The uncertainty among the
circuits on which child abuse investigations satisfy the special needs
doctrine demonstrates the difficulty of applying the doctrine
consistently. In order to understand how the circuits are applying the
same standard, this Section first explains the relevant principles that
shape the circuit opinions discussed in Part III. This Section then
discusses the confusion the special needs doctrine has created among
the circuits and concludes with a discussion of the current state of
child abuse investigations in the United States.
A. The Foundationof Special Needs: FindingFunctionality in the
FourthAmendment
To understand the special needs doctrine, one must first
examine the cases that led to the famous T.L.O. opinion. While the
Supreme Court created the special needs doctrine in T.L.O., the
modern administrative search cases beginning in Camara v.
Municipal Court laid the foundation for this opinion. 23 In Camara,the
Court decided the constitutionality of a statute authorizing a
warrantless search of a home for the purposes of a civil health and

19. Id.
20. Relying heavily on the 1967 opinion Camara v. Municipal Court, the Supreme Court
incorporated the "frustrat[ing] the governmental purpose" language it used to validate civil
searches by health inspectors based on generalized suspicion, to support a search of an
individual student based on the special circumstances created by the school environment. Id. at
340 (quoting Camara,387 U.S. at 533).
21. See id. at 337.
22. See infra Part II.C.
23. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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safety inspection and without probable cause that the dwelling
violated the housing code. 24 The Court recognized that requiring an
individualized probable cause standard for housing inspections would
inevitably hinder the government's high public health and safety
interests. 25 Therefore, it adopted a balancing test to determine
whether the inspection was reasonable. 26 The Camara balancing test,
which would serve as the basis of the administrative search doctrine,
weighed the government's objectives in performing the search against
the personal privacy interests of the individual to determine if the
government's actions were valid under the Fourth Amendment. 27 In
Camara, however, the Court was not ready to authorize a search of
the home without a warrant, even for the purposes of a civil health
inspection, given the homeowner's personal privacy and security
2
interests. 8
In the twelve years following Camara,the Court continued to
shape the administrative search doctrine gradually, easing the rigors
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to create a functional mechanism
in situations where the warrant and probable cause standards would
be impractical. In a companion case to Camara, the Court in See v.
Seattle applied the same balancing-test approach to fire inspections of
a warehouse, although it continued to require a warrant to authorize
the search. 29 The Court later removed the warrant requirement from
cases involving heavily regulated industries such as liquor stores 30

24. Id. at 527. While the inspector had generalized probable cause that there were
violations of the health code in a given area, the Court differentiated this from individualized
probable cause, which required that the inspector have probable cause to search the specific
house he suspected contained health code violations. Id. at 533-39.
25. Here the Court mentioned "fires and epidemics" as potential physical hazards as well as
the economic hazards of "unsightly conditions," which would affect the value of surrounding
properties. Id. at 535.
26. Id. at 534-35.
27. Id. at 536-37 ("Unfortunately, there can be no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search
entails.").
28. Id. at 530-31 ("For instance, even the most law-abiding citizen has a very tangible
interest in limiting the circumstances under which the sanctity of his home may be broken by
official authority, for the possibility of criminal entry under the guise of official sanction is a
serious threat to personal and family security."). The Court continued to recognize that the
warrant requirement was not only a safety measure to protect against unreasonable intrusions
into a person's home, but also a mechanism to assure the homeowner that the inspector is in fact
authorized to perform the search in question. Id. at 532.
29. 387 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1967). The Court continued to explain in dicta that it is possible
that businesses might reasonably be inspected in many more situations than homes. Id.
30. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77 (1970).
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and pawnshops selling firearms, 31 because violations of liquor and
firearms statutes could be easily concealed. As the Court explained,
"In this context, the prerequisite of a warrant could easily frustrate
inspection; and if the necessary flexibility as to time, scope, and
frequency is to be preserved, the protections afforded by a warrant
would be negligible."3 2 The administrative search doctrine underwent
its final revisions in Donovan v. Dewey, where the Court upheld the
warrantless inspection of a mine, because Congress's regulations were
sufficiently strict in design so as to deny the inspector unbridled
discretion, thus serving as a "constitutionally adequate substitute for
a warrant."33 Dewey created, for the first time, the opportunity for the
government to perform a warrantless search based on less than
probable cause.
As demonstrated above, the administrative search doctrine
requires a showing of four elements prior to the performance of a
warrantless administrative search. First, the government must
demonstrate a substantial interest in the search, usually linked to the
health and safety needs of the community. 34 Second, the search must
be reasonable to the extent that the interests of the government
outweigh the privacy interests of the individual, which often turns on
the nature of the search. 35 Third, the government must demonstrate
36
that requiring a warrant would frustrate the governmental purpose.
Finally, the government can overcome the warrant requirement by
creating guidelines that provide a "constitutionally adequate
37
substitute" for the warrant requirement.
Understanding the administrative search doctrine is important
when viewed in the context of the rise of the special needs doctrine.
However, the connection between the two doctrines is baffling given

31. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972).
32. Id. at 316.
33. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600-603 (1981).
34. Id. at 602; see also Biswell, 406 U.S. at 315 (recognizing that "close scrutiny of [gun]
traffic is undeniably of central importance to federal efforts to prevent violent crime and to assist
the States in regulating the firearms traffic within their borders"); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387
U.S. 523, 537 (1967) (noting that health inspections are "of indispensable importance to the
maintenance of community health").
35. Camara,387 U.S. at 536-37.
36. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 603; Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316; see also Camara, 387 U.S. at 533
(rejecting the warrantless search, but noting that "assessing whether the public interest
demands creation of a general exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement . ..
depends in part upon whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the
governmental purpose behind the search").
37. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 599, 603.
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the significant differences between when the court applies the two
doctrines. Administrative searches were justified because the searches
were limited in their intrusiveness, supported by substantial
government interests, and would frustrate important governmental
purposes if governed by the Fourth Amendment. 38 Yet, as the next
Section illustrates, unlike the previous administrative searches, the
special needs cases often relied upon searches that were far more
intrusive.3 9 Furthermore, the special needs cases did little to limit an
official's discretion in conducting searches. 40 Finally, while special
needs cases often involve individuals with a lower expectation of
privacy than those involved with administrative searches, special
needs cases are more troubling because they are "more likely to carry
the stigmatic burdens associated with the suspicion of wrongdoing." 41
B. T.L.O.: Turning Administrative Searches into Special Needs
The special needs doctrine began in T.L.O. While the Court's
majority opinion never used the term "special needs," the majority
opinion's rationale combined with the language in Justice Blackmun's
concurring opinion would be used to shape the doctrine over the next
thirty-five years. 42 T.L.O. involved a school official's warrantless
search of a student's purse. 43 While the Court, relying heavily on
Camara, held that the Fourth Amendment protects against
unwarranted intrusions by any government official, including those in
the public school system, 44 the Court balanced that expectation of
privacy against "the substantial interest of teachers and
administrators in maintaining discipline in the classroom and on
school grounds." 45 As one of the primary factors supporting the
reasonableness balancing test, school officials were not as familiar

38. See Eve Brensike Primus, DisentanglingAdministrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV.
254, 270-73 (2011).
39. Id. at 271.
40.

Id.

41. Id. at 272.
42. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 323-50. While the phrase "special needs" appears in
a footnote in the majority opinion, id. at 332 n.2, the term "special needs" is specifically
attributed to Justice Blackmun's concurrence. Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the
judgment).
43. Id. at 328.
44. Id. at 334-35.
45. Id. at 339.
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with the probable cause standard as police officers were and therefore
46
should not be bound by the "niceties of probable cause."
It is important to note that this lower standard did not open
the door for all types of searches. Only searches that satisfy the twoprong reasonableness analysis will qualify as constitutional under the
special needs doctrine.47 First, the state's action must be "justified at
its inception," meaning that the state had "reasonable grounds for
suspecting that the search will turn up evidence" prior to conducting
the search.48 Second, the means used to conduct that search must be
"reasonably related to the objectives of the search" such that the
search is not "excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the
49
student and the nature of the infraction."
While the Court's majority opinion provided the foundation for
the special needs doctrine, the doctrine can only be appreciated
through the prism of Justice Blackmun's concurrence. Justice
Blackmun authored his concurrence under the belief that the Court
had omitted a key first step. 50 Before employing the majority's
balancing test, a court must first find an "exceptional circumstance[]
in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,
51
make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable."
Absent an exceptional need, such as the school's need for discipline
and the prevention of drug and gun possession on campus, the
traditional Fourth Amendment warrant and probable cause
52
requirements bind the state.
In T.L.O., the Court established a new test for searches of
individuals with a reduced expectation of privacy. 53 Under this new
test, the Court lowered the requirements demanded by the Fourth
Amendment based on three conditions. First, similar to the

46. Id. at 343.
47. Id. at 341-42.
48. Id. at 342. In the context of the school search, the evidence the school official expects to
find must link the student to a violation of either the 'law or the rules of the school." Id.
49. Id. at 342. Justice Stevens focused primarily on the "nature of the infraction" language
proposed by the majority. Specifically, Justice Stevens would limit the school's authority to
conduct searches that "will uncover evidence that the student is violating the law or engaging in
conduct that is seriously disruptive of school order, or the educational process." Id. at 377-78
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis omitted).
50. Id. at 352 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) ('The Court's implication that the
balancing test is the rule rather than the exception is troubling for me because it is unnecessary
in this case.")
51. Id. at 351(Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
52. Id. at 352-53 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
53. Primus, supra note 38, at 270-71.
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administrative search context, the state must demonstrate a
substantial interest that would be unduly hindered by the warrant
and probable cause standard. The second prong is where the special
needs doctrine differs from its predecessor. Whereas the
administrative search context limited the intrusiveness of the search,
the special needs test weighs the intrusiveness of the search against
the state's interest in conducting the search. Finally, the nature of the
search must reasonably relate to the government's interests in
performing the search.
C. Special Needs: The Development of an Exception and the Confusion
It Caused
While the Court has tried to define it, the special needs
doctrine has become less clear since T.L.O. In O'Connor v. Ortega, the
Court held that the special needs doctrine applied to searches of
government employees' offices for "noninvestigatory, work-related
54
purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct."
Ortega developed two important elements of the special needs
doctrine. First, the Ortega test embraced Justice Blackmun's opinion
that the special needs doctrine should apply only when the
government's "interest [is] substantially different from 'the normal
need for law enforcement.' ",5 Second, while the T.L.O. case merely
implied a lower expectation of privacy, the Ortega case explicitly
referenced a government employee's reduced expectation of privacy as
56
a primary factor in its analysis.
Subsequent cases in the special needs context repeatedly relied
on the concept of a party's reduced expectation of privacy. The Court
found that probationers 57 and parolees 58 have a reduced expectation of
privacy based on their state supervision; in conjunction with the
special needs of the supervision system, this reduced expectation

54. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725-26 (1987).
55. Id. at 724 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment)).
56. Compare id. at 717 ("Public employees' expectations of privacy in their offices, desks,
and file cabinets, like similar expectations of employees in the private sector, may be reduced by
virtue of actual office practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation."), with T.L.O., 469
U.S. at 340 (majority opinion) ("How, then, should we strike the balance between the
schoolchild's legitimate expectations of privacy and the school's equally legitimate need to
maintain an environment in which learning can take place?").
57. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874, 878 (1987).
58. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 849-50 (2006).
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requires applying the special needs doctrine to home searches. 59 Later,
the Court extended the reduced expectation of privacy rationale to
student athletes being tested for drugs, 6 0 students participating in
extracurricular activities,6 1 persons working in highly regulated
63
industries, 62 and federal customs officials.
While the Court has consistently relied on the reduced
expectation of privacy rationale to support the application of the
special needs doctrine, the Court's primary focus has been on the
language articulated in Justice Blackmun's concurrence from T.L.O.
that the government must show a substantial need "beyond the
normal need for law enforcement."' 64 Specifically, in this first prong,
the Court is concerned about the involvement of police and law
enforcement in the search and the purpose of the search. In T.L.O., for
example, the Court did not rule against the school for turning over
evidence found in the search to the police.6 5 Secondary criminal
repercussions that develop around a civil search alone do not make
non-law-enforcement searches unreasonable under the Fourth
66
Amendment.
However, where the government has dual purposes in
conducting the search, such that the search is inherently linked to the
discovery of criminal activity or the search is entangled with law
enforcement, the Court will not apply the special needs doctrine. 67 In
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Court rejected a public hospital's
policy of testing pregnant women for cocaine use to encourage them to
seek drug counseling and treatment, because the hospital relied
heavily on the coercion of law enforcement. 68 Despite the hospital's
legitimate interest in protecting the health of the mother and child,

59. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874, 878; see also Samson, 547 U.S. at 849-50. While the Court did
not use the term special needs in this case, the authority rests on the same principles and came
to the same conclusion as the special needs cases. A different interpretation of Samson is that
the case created a broader range of authority for the government even greater than those powers
granted under the special needs doctrine based on the parolee's "severely diminished privacy
expectation." See id. at 852.
60. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995).
61. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 831-32 (2002).
62. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989).
63. Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 671 (1989)
64. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
65. Id. at 340.
66. See id. (finding the maintenance of order and discipline in the school to be the primary
aim of the school official's search).
67. Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79 (2001).
68. Id. at 79-81.
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the Court was troubled by the police's day-to-day role in administering
the policy, the perception that the policy's immediate goal was to
"generate evidence for law enforcement," and the use of police coercion
in forcing the mothers into treatment. 69 The Court was suspicious of
this entanglement with law enforcement and thus found that where
the special need was not "divorced from the state's general interest in
70
law enforcement," the Court will not apply the doctrine.
Recently, the Court attempted to define its intrusiveness
standard clearly in Safford Unified School District v. Redding. In that
case, the school principal ordered thirteen-year-old Savana Redding to
strip down to her underwear and then instructed her to "pull her bra
out and to the side and shake it, and to pull out the elastic on her
underpants, thus exposing her breasts and pelvic area to some
degree"; this search was based on a report alleging that Redding was
distributing medicine to other students and other incriminating
evidence found in Redding's day planner. 71 The Redding case
expounded on the requisite knowledge necessary to perform a search,
holding that the state's pre-search information must suggest a
"moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing." 72
However, the Court's primary focus was on the scope of the
search, which the Court classified as a "strip search." 73 The Court, in
considering the individual's privacy expectations, considered both
subjective 74 and reasonable societal expectations 75 of personal privacy
implicated in strip searching a teen. Merely having a high privacy
interest, however, is not enough to bar the search. The search in
Redding failed not because Redding had a high privacy interest but
rather because "the content of the suspicion failed to match the degree

69. Id. at 82-84 (emphasis omitted). The Court considered the generation of evidence, in the
form of drug test results, as the "immediate objective" of the drug testing policy. The purpose of
the evidence collected is one of the central tenets of the Ferguson test. Id. at 68.
70. Id. at 79 & n.15, 82.
71. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2638 (2009). The
incriminating evidence included: knives, lighters, a cigarette, four white prescription-strength
ibuprofen 400-mg pills, and one over-the-counter blue naproxen 200-mg pill, which were all
banned by the school. Id.
72. Id. at 2639.
73. Id. at 2641 ('The exact label for this final step in the intrusion is not important, though
strip search is a fair way to speak of it.").
74. The Court recognized that the search made Savana feel humiliated, afraid, and

embarrassed. Id.
75. On the societal expectation, the Court took judicial notice of the fact that most schools
ban the use of strip searches. Id. at 2642.
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of intrusion." 76 Redding makes clear that the scope of the search must
relate not only to the state's interest in performing the search but also
to the knowledge that justified the search. Therefore, in order to
perform a highly intrusive search, the state must have a very strong
interest in performing the search, and the information supporting the
search must specifically be linked to the intrusive search. 77
While the evolution of the special needs doctrine has shown
some general trends, the doctrine's balancing test has caused
considerable confusion among the lower courts and has come under
considerable criticism from scholars as well. As the Tenth Circuit
noted, "At this stage in [the] development of the doctrine, the 'special
needs' category is defined more by a list of examples than by a
determinative set of criteria .... [t]he Supreme Court has not told us
what, precisely, this set of cases has in common."7 8 The Fifth Circuit
concurred with this observation and explained that the Supreme
Court's "vague test for finding a 'special need' caused the federal
circuits to diverge over" the "substantive question" of child abuse
investigations.7 9 Professor Primus compares the entire administrative
search regime to the "pre-Miranda voluntariness test both in terms of
the lack of guidance . . . and in terms of the confusion in the lower
80
courts."
Furthermore, the imposition of a balancing test, as employed
by the special needs doctrine, is bound to create dissention among the
lower courts. Professor Doriane Coleman notes that "[c]onstitutional
balancing tests ... have been strongly criticized for their lack of rigor
and for their outcomes."8' As Professor Coleman explains, balancing
76. Id. The school lacked the necessary knowledge that would specifically connect the
information that prompted the search and the scope of the search itself. Specifically, the school
lacked "facts that pointed to Savana[,] ... any indication of danger to the students from the
power of the drugs or their quantity, and any reason to suppose that Savana was carrying pills
in her underwear." Because the school's antidrug interest was not significantly high (as
compared to other illegal drugs) and the school's information did not suggest that a strip search
would turn over evidence, the search was unreasonable. Id. at 2642-43.
77. Id. at 2642-43. Specifically, the information must suggest that the specifically intrusive
search would likely lead to the discovery of evidence and not that the investigation generally
would produce evidence. The distinction lies in the specificity of the evidence. In Redding, the
school received reports that Savana was bringing drugs to school. This supports a general
suspicion that Savana has drugs on her person. However, if the school received reports that
Savana smuggled drugs in by hiding the drugs in her bra and underwear, this would be
specifically linked to the search performed in Redding. See id.
78. Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1213 (10th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
79. Roe v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 409 (5th Cir. 2002).
80. Primus, supranote 38, at 300.
81. Coleman, supra note 6, at 531.
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tests, such as the one employed under the special needs doctrine,
"tend to reflect normative judgments rather than objective conclusions
about the merits of the evidence," as the courts "rely instead on [their]
values-laden characterization of the relevant competing interests to
justify [their] outcomes. '8 2 Without clear guidance from the Supreme
Court on what constitutes a special need and how they should balance
the interest, the circuits are left to their own devices to create a
system which in their view best comports with the values set forth in
T.L.O. and its progeny. Doing so forces the lower courts to rely on
their own "normative judgments" and "value-laden characterizations,"
causing confusion over what precisely constitutes a special need.
D. Child Abuse in the United States
As demonstrated above, there is no set definition for what
types of cases fall within the realm of the special needs doctrine.
Therefore, before a court can determine whether a government search
falls within the special needs exception, it must first have a thorough
understanding of the problem the state faces. In the context of child
abuse, it is important to consider the magnitude of the problem and
the costs of investigating abuse allegations.
The current state of child abuse in the United States illustrates
the complicated problem that the states confront. During 2009, it is
or
estimated that approximately 763,000 incidents of child abuse
83
neglect occurred, involving 702,000 children in the United States. Of
these victims, over seventy-five percent of them were under the age of
eleven.8 4 However, that same year, more than 3.3 million child abuse
allegations were reported in the United States involving
approximately six million children-more than seven times the
number of children actually abused.8 5 Of the 3.3 million reports, CPS
agencies deemed approximately two million (61.9 percent) of them
credible enough to warrant an investigation.8 6 Of the two million
investigations performed, CPS agents substantiated approximately

82. Id. at 531-32.
83.

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, CHILD MALTREATMENT 2009, at 21 (2009)

[hereinafter CHILD MALTREATMENT],
cm09.pdf.
84. Id. at 22.
85. Id. at 6.
86. Id. at 7.

available at www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm09/
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442,100 reports (22.1 percent) of abuse victims, while finding
87
approximately 1.3 million reports (64.1 percent) unsubstantiated.
The considerable difference between the number of reports and
the number of children actually found to have been abused is
surprising at first. A closer examination produces several
explanations. First, the screening process utilized by CPS serves as an
effective screen, funneling out reports that are not credible before an
investigation begins.8 8 Second, as Doctor Tisha Wiley recognized,
absent an investigation of the child, the state is left with little
evidence to corroborate an abuse allegation because physical evidence
is either inconclusive or nonexistent.8 9 This lack of physical evidence
can halt an investigation before it even starts. Furthermore, if an
investigation develops and becomes more intensive, a trained child
services agent can successfully winnow out unsubstantiated claims
from those that truly warrant a further investigation. 90 However, it is
possible that the number of actually abused children is even higher,
given the difficulties posed by child abuse investigations. 91
While the high number of abuse cases creates a compelling
interest for the state, the aftermath of these investigations creates
considerable costs. In 2009, over 1.1 million CPS investigations were
fruitless, either due to lack of evidence or because the child was never
abused.92 While some of these investigations may have simply
consisted of interviews, 93 others involved an intrusive physical
94
examination similar to the strip search of Jochebed Good.
These highly intrusive searches have caused the greatest
confusion among the circuits. The special needs doctrine requires the
most thorough review in those cases that involve strip searches,

87. Id. at 8.
88. Id. at 5-6.
89. Tisha R. Wiley, Legal and Social Service Responses to Child Sexual Abuse: A Primer
and Discussion of Relevant Research, 18 J. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 267, 275 (2009).
90. CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 83, at 6.
91. The tragic death of Kessler Wilkerson addresses some of these problems. Most notably,
the lack of reporting, the child's inability or refusal to call for help, and the parent's involvement
or ignorance of the abuse all place considerable hindrances in the face of CPS agents.
92. CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 83, at 8.
93. See Investigation of Child Sexual Abuse, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVICES, ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/usermanuals/

sexabuse/sexabused.cfm (last visited Feb. 18, 2012) ("If no confirming evidence emerges and
there is no other supporting evidence, the CPS worker will usually deny the case after a single
interview.").
94. Supra Part I.
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interviews of the child without parental consent, or both. 95 While the
problem of child abuse is as real as it is large, the solutions and tools
available for investigating child abuse place a considerable burden on
an even larger population of children.
The size and the nature of the child abuse epidemic pose major
challenges for the state. The problems created by child abuse
investigations exist primarily because these cases involve three
separate parties (the state, the child, and the parents), each with
strong and legitimate interests in the way the state conducts the
investigation. These interests overlap with one another, which leads to
a myriad of questions that a judge must resolve. How can the state
gather the requisite information to act when the child is either too
young or too scared to talk? How should the court weigh the child's
privacy and personal autonomy interests, the constitutional rights of
the parents to raise their children, and the state's interest in
protecting children who cannot protect themselves? How does the
state substantiate the reports of others when the individual, who is
allegedly conducting the abuse, controls access to the home and the
child? Can courts differentiate between a parent's dual interests in
protecting the child's privacy and in keeping information away from
the state? Should this potential conflict of interest diminish the
parent's rights to challenge the actions of CPS?
While the state has a difficult job investigating allegations of
child abuse, those investigations often come with incredible emotional
costs that the child and family must bear. While the state's mission to
protect children from abuse and to investigate allegations of abuse is
certainly commendable, innocent parents, such as Sandra Good, often
face significant and unwarranted emotional consequences. The
96
significant stigma that surrounds an allegation of child abuse,
coupled with the fact that many of these parents often must watch or
actively participate in the highly intrusive, physical examinations of
their children, 97 can leave an indelible mark on the memories of the
parents.
However, the greatest costs of child abuse investigations are
borne by the children themselves. The children in these cases are not

95. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the heightened interests of the child and parents during
these types of investigations).
96. Coleman, supranote 6, at 497-98.
97. E.g., Roe v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 399 (5th Cir.
2002); Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808, 811 (9th Cir. 1999); Good v. Dauphin Cnty. Soc. Servs.
for Children & Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1089-90 (3d Cir. 1989).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:2:563

just parties to a dispute but people with "names, faces, and stories
that ought not to be hidden from view."98 In wretched irony, the child
bears much of the emotional consequences of temporary seizures and
physical examinations that are done for his protection. For example, it
is the child, and not the alleged wrongdoer, who is forced to endure the
humiliating and frightening experience of a strip search at the hands
of the state. On the other hand, preserving the dignity of the American
family and the personal autonomy of the child in the face of a grave
social epidemic could lead to a child's unnecessary exposure to
physical, sexual, and emotional abuse, which can result in the serious
injury or death of the child. It is with this understanding of the full
complexity of the child abuse problem that the confusion among the
circuits can be properly considered.

III. THE NIGHTMARE SPLIT
Given the legitimate interests of the state, parents, and child,
as well as the Supreme Court's lack of guidance, it would not be
surprising if the federal circuits were divided on how the special needs
doctrine applies to child abuse investigations. While it is not
surprising that confusion exists among the federal circuits on how the
special needs doctrine applies to child abuse investigations, the
circuits have actually developed a comprehensive and consistent body
of case law on when the special needs doctrine applies. Specifically,
the circuits have consistently relied on a series of factors including:
the location of the search, the involvement of law enforcement officers,
the intrusiveness of the search, and the existence of discretionlimiting statutes or regulations. However, to understand the potential
for a united body of case law, it is important to examine how the
circuits created the perception of a split.
At first glance, the circuits appear to be divided into three basic
approaches. The first approach, originally created by the Seventh
Circuit and later adopted by the Fourth and Tenth Circuits, applies
the special needs doctrine to child abuse investigations.9 9 The second
approach, adopted by the Second, Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits,
holds that the special needs doctrine does not apply to child abuse
investigations, particularly when the search is in the home or involves

98. Coleman, supranote 6, at 446.
99. See Doe v. Bagan, 41 F.3d 571, 574 n.3 (10th Cir. 1994); Wildauer v. Frederick Cnty.,
993 F.2d 369, 372-73 (4th Cir. 1993); Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 900-02 (7th Cir. 1986).
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law enforcement. 100 The third approach, developed when the Seventh
Circuit revised its position, creates a jurisdictional element that
determines the appropriateness of applying the special needs doctrine
to child abuse investigations based on where the search or seizure
occurs. Under this approach, cases often turn on whether the search
occurred in a public school, a private school, or the home.°10
This Part examines how the federal circuits came to perceive a
three-way split. Section A considers the rationale supporting the
application of the special needs doctrine advanced by the Fourth,
Seventh, and Tenth Circuits. Section B then considers the competing
rationale found in the Second, Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits'
rejection of the special needs doctrine. Section C illustrates how the
Seventh Circuit has appeared to separate itself from the Fourth and
Tenth Circuits by creating an additional jurisdictional approach.
A. The Special Needs Circuits: The Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuit
Approach
The circuits that apply the special needs doctrine to child abuse
investigations acknowledge the application of the doctrine in three
cases with significant factual differences. While each court discusses
the special needs analysis in a similar manner, these factual
differences require us to examine each circuit separately.
1. The Seventh Circuit
In Darryl H. v. Coler, the Seventh Circuit became the first
court to affirmatively recognize the applicability of the special needs
doctrine to investigations of child abuse. In doing so, Darryl H. also
laid the foundation for other circuits to apply the special needs
doctrine to child abuse investigations. Darryl H. was a consolidated
appeal challenging the Illinois Department of Children and Family
Services ("DCFS") policies. 10 2 Under DCFS policies, an investigation
into an allegation of child abuse could only begin if the allegation

100. See Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1027 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated in part, 131 S. Ct.
2020 (2011); Roe, 299 F.3d at 406-07; Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 606 (2d Cir. 1999);
Calabretta,189 F.3d at 816-17; Good, 891 F.2d at 1093-94.
101. Compare Michael C. v. Gresbach, 526 F.3d 1008, 1015 (7th Cir. 2008) (applying
traditional Fourth Amendment analysis when search conducted on private school grounds), and
Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 512 (7th Cir. 2003) (same), with Darryl H., 801 F.2d at 900-02
(applying special needs inside public schools).
102. Darryl H., 801 F.2d at 894.
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satisfied a litany of requirements. 10 3 If an allegation met the
requirements, a DCFS caseworker could interview the child and
caretaker, observe the home environment, and potentially perform a
physical examination of the child.104
While the cases were consolidated, the court examined each
plaintiffs case individually, beginning with "B.D." and "A.O." Four
months after receiving a report that A.O. was physically abused, a
DCFS caseworker interviewed A.O. at his school and asked A.O. to
remove his shirt and pants so that the caseworker could examine him
for signs of abuse. 10 5 In the spring of 1981, armed with an anonymous
allegation, a DCFS caseworker went to ten-year-old B.D.'s school and
10 6
asked the child to remove his pants to look for signs of abuse.
Finally, in the fall of 1982, DCFS agents asked two children, Lee and
Marlena, to disrobe in a "semi-private room" of their school to look for
signs of abuse, despite the children denying the abuse and the
caseworkers' discovery of evidence undermining the abuse
107
allegation.
After finding that the visual inspection of the children clearly
implicated the Fourth Amendment,1 0 8 the Seventh Circuit addressed
the essential issue that the two consolidated cases shared: whether a
DCFS caseworker, following the agency policy listed by the court, can
constitutionally conduct a nude body search of a child "without
meeting the strictures of probable cause or the warrant
requirement."'1 0 9 Applying the T.L.O. balancing test, the court began
its analysis by recognizing that "nude physical examination is a

103. Id. at 895. Under Illinois law, a child could only be investigated when the allegation
involved: (1) a child younger than eighteen years old; (2) who was harmed or in danger of being
harmed; (3) by a specified incident of abuse; and (4) either (a) "a parent, caretaker, sibling or
babysitter" was the person neglecting the child or (b) "a parent, caretaker, adult family member,
adult individual residing in the child's home, parent's paramour, sibling or babysitter" was the
individual abusing the child. Id.
104. Id. at 896. Due to the intrusive nature of a physical examination, DCFS caseworkers
must inform the caretaker of their intent to perform such a search and explain that the
examination could be performed by a physician, the caseworker, or the school nurse. Id.
105. Id. at 897.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 905-06.
108. Id. at 899-900. For the purposes of this Note, all of the cases will be assumed to
implicate the Fourth Amendment unless otherwise stated. This is primarily because a court
would not address the special needs doctrine without first finding that the action taken by the
state implicated the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, no extensive examination of the nature of
the state action is needed outside its applicability to the special needs doctrine.
109. Id. at 901. While the policy was applied to both investigations, only one party was
actively seeking to challenge the policy itself. Id.
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significant intrusion into the child's privacy," due not only to the
humiliation of the search itself but also to the search's potential for
long-term psychological side effects. 110 The court further acknowledged
that although other methods of investigation may be more intrusive to
the child, that fact does not diminish the substantial intrusion of a
nude body search.1 1 The court also recognized the "closely related
legitimate expectations of the parents or other caretakers . . . that
their familial relationship will not be subject to unwarranted state
intrusion." 112 As the court observed, "The fundamental liberty interest
of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child
does not evaporate simply because they have not been model
11 3
parents."
Despite these strong interests, the court recognized that the
state's need was substantial and multifaceted. 1 4 As the court
observed, there is no more worthy public calling than the protection of
children." 5 The court found that, due to the nature of child abuse
investigations and the need to remove a child from a dangerous home
as quickly as possible, the time allotted to the state in conducting
these investigations is very short. 1 6 The court rationalized the use of
nude strip searches by acknowledging that a physical inspection is the
quickest way to assess the credibility of an abuse allegation. 1 7
Ironically, relying on concerns for familial privacy, the court
recognized that a nude body search might actually best protect
familial privacy from an otherwise extensive home investigation."18
While evidence from the search could be used in a criminal
investigation, that fact is secondary to protecting the child. 1 9 As such,
the special needs doctrine was appropriate for child abuse
20
investigations. 1

110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)).
114. Id. at 902.
115. Id. ("There is no more worthy object of the public's concern.") (quoting Wyman v. James,
400 U.S. 309, 318 (1971)). The court relied on the fact that in 1982, seventy-two children died in
Illinois due to child abuse. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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Finding special needs, the court then examined the
reasonableness of the searches in question. While the court refused to
definitively state whether the strip searches were unreasonable, it
12
noted several reservations regarding the DCFS guidelines. '
Specifically, the court noted that at least half of the reports made to
DCFS in a given year are unfounded. 122 While speed is of the essence
and third-party corroboration is often counterproductive, that the
policy did not seek further corroboration when time permitted
disturbed the court. 12 3 The court noted that lengthy delays between
the allegation and the investigation or the discovery "of information
which cast serious doubt on the validity of the charge" were not
124
reasonable under the special needs doctrine.
2. The Fourth Circuit
The Seventh Circuit stood alone for seven years in its
application of the special needs doctrine to child abuse investigations
until the Fourth Circuit adopted its rationale in Wildauer v. Frederick
County.125 Wildauer is unique because it involved a foster parent who
did "not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in a
continued relationship with [her] foster child."' 26 In Wildauer, the
caseworker, responding to a neglect allegation, entered and searched
the Wildauer's house with nurses to "investigate [the children's]
27
medical histories, medications, and schooling."'
While relying largely on Darryl H., the Fourth Circuit based its
decision on two additional factors. First, the Fourth Circuit
interpreted the Supreme Court's Wyman v. James to stand for the
proposition that home visits by social workers are subject to less

121. Id. at 903.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 907. The court was also concerned that DCFS policy did not require at least some
corroboration where the reports are made by anonymous sources, minors or other "reasonably
suspect" sources and that the policies did not "differentiate between the search of the very young
child and the search of a child with the maturity and ability to communicate." Id. at 903. This
distinction is important given the Supreme Court's instruction that age should be taken into
consideration when considering the reasonableness of a particular search. New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985).
125. Wildauer v. Frederick Cnty., 993 F.2d 369, 373 (4th Cir. 1993).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 371. Cruger's initial search of the home was done to recover children whose
natural parents demanded returned to them. The initial search was lawful as Wildauer invited
her inside to search for two of the children. Id.
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scrutiny than criminal investigations. 128 This proposition is a
particularly broad interpretation of the Wyman opinion, which the
Court decided on consent grounds and not the reasonableness of the
search.129 That the Court took great efforts to distinguish Wyman from
its prior administrative search cases emphasizes this further.1 30
Second, since Darryl H. held that the state interest in a child abuse
investigation supersedes the natural parents' interests, it must then
supersede a foster parent's attenuated interest.13 1
3. The Tenth Circuit
One year later, the Tenth Circuit, in Doe v. Bagan, became the
third circuit to apply the special needs doctrine to child abuse
investigations. Notably, just a year earlier, the Tenth Circuit rejected
the special needs doctrine in Franz v. Lytle.132 In Franz, Officer Lytle,
who was investigating a neglect allegation about baby Ashley, asked
the babysitter to remove the child's diaper so that he could take
several pictures of the vaginal region before informing the parents. 133
Officer Lytle later returned with a female officer who performed a
more probing physical investigation before ordering a complete
medical examination.134
The Tenth Circuit in Franz rejected the applicability of Darryl
H. on several grounds. First, the court held that a strip search that
involved photographing and touching the child's nude body is
unreasonable even under special needs. 135 Second, the Tenth Circuit

128. Id. at 372.
129. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 317-18 (1971). In Wyman, the New York statute made
it a requirement that welfare recipients must make their homes open to inspection or have their
benefits revoked. As such, the Court's opinion determined that since the individual could simply
refuse to accept welfare, by accepting the benefits, the individual consented to the search thereby
negating any Fourth Amendment claim. Id.
130. Id. at 324-25.
131. Wildauer, 993 F.2d at 373. Interestingly enough, the Court never distinguished between
Wildauer's position as a foster parent to nine of the children and her status as the legal guardian
of her natural son and adopted son. Given the Fourth Circuit's considerable reliance on Darryl
H., however, it seems unlikely that the differentiation between the two statuses would have
made any difference. See id.
132. Franz v. Lytle, 997 F.2d 784, 791 (10th Cir. 1993).
133. Id. at 785.
134. Id. at 785-86. The second physical examination involved specific acts of touching the
child in order to gauge the child's response. For a more detailed description of this process, see

id.
135. Id. at 790.
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was concerned about the involvement of the police.1 36 This distinction
is important given T.L.O.'s rationale that other officials require
special needs because they are not fully versed in the niceties of
probable cause like police officers. 13 7 As the Tenth Circuit recognized,
when the investigation's "focus was not so much on the child as it was
on the potential criminal culpability of her parents," special needs is
not appropriate because the search is primarily for law enforcement
purposes. 13 8 Finally, the court was concerned that the state lacked a
written policy that would limit the officer's discretion.139
The Bagan case is interesting because, unlike most other
special needs cases, the child examined was not the alleged victim but
the alleged perpetrator. 140 In Bagan, the caseworker Bagan
interviewed John Doe, a nine-year-old boy, who was accused of
sexually assaulting a five-year-old girl.14 1 Knowing the girl had tested
positive for chlamydia, Bagan ordered Doe to submit to a test by a
doctor.1 42 Because the court held that the parents consented to the
chlamydia test,1 43 the court only addressed the in-school interview.
After assuming that the interview was a "seizure," the court
applied the T.L.O. balancing test to the interview and determined that
the temporary seizure was reasonable.1 44 The Tenth Circuit, however,
provided no basis for why it analyzed the "seizure" under T.L.O. as
opposed to the traditional Fourth Amendment standard. The Tenth
Circuit, in Jones v. Hunt, would later suggest that this balancing test
might also apply when a social worker removes a child from "parents'
custody at a public school."1 45 Although the Tenth Circuit has yet to
endorse the special needs doctrine explicitly, at least one circuit has
136. Id. The court emphasized the fact that the officers were always in full uniform and
carried firearms. Id. at 785.
137. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 343 (1985) ("[T]he standard will spare teachers
and school administrators the necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of probable cause
.... "1).

138. Franz, 997 F.2d at 791. When an officer's focus is on a possible criminal investigation,
the focus does not satisfy the requirement that the search be "beyond the normal need for law
enforcement." O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 724 (1987) (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351
(Blackmun, J., concurring)).
139. Franz, 997 F.2d at 789.
140. Doe v. Bagan, 41 F.3d 571, 574 (10th Cir. 1994).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 576-77 ("Doe's mother, however, did at all times remain free to refuse to have her
son tested until later in the investigatory process.")
144. Id. at 575 n.3.
145. Jones v. Hunt, 410 F.3d 1221, 1228 n.4 (10th Cir. 2005). It is interesting to note the
Court again refused to call the case a special needs case. Id.
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interpreted Bagan as the Tenth Circuit's adoption of the special needs

doctrine. 146
B. The Rejecting Circuits: The Second, Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuit
Approach
1. The Third Circuit
Three years after Darryl H., the Third Circuit refused to
consider the special needs doctrine in Good v. Dauphin County Social
Services for Children & Youth. As described in Part I, at
approximately 10 p.m., caseworker Hooper and a female police officer
arrived at the home of Sandra Good based on an anonymous tip that
her daughter Jochebed was being abused. 147 After talking with Sandra
Good, Hooper allegedly chased a frightened Jochebed and then had
the policewoman conduct a strip search of Jochebed, despite no signs
148
of abuse.
The Good case is particularly telling of the Third Circuit's view
of the special needs doctrine because it does not even address the
applicability of the doctrine.149 Recognizing that the state did not have
probable cause, the Third Circuit proceeded to the traditional Fourth
Amendment defenses of consent and exigent circumstances. 150 The
Third Circuit rejected the special needs doctrine, arguing that the
court found "no suggestion . . .that the governing principles [of the
Fourth Amendment] should vary depending on the court's assessment
of the gravity of the societal risk involved."'' 1 This statement is odd
given the Supreme Court's majority and concurring opinions in T.L.O.
recognizing that exceptional circumstances may authorize a more
lenient Fourth Amendment test.152 Finally, the lack of "any

146. See Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1026 n. 11 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated in part, 131
S. Ct. 2020 (2011).
147. Good v. Dauphin Cnty. Soc. Servs. for Children & Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1089-90 (3d
Cir. 1989).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1092 ('The decided case law made it clear that the state may not ... conduct a
search of a home or strip search of a person's body in the absence of consent, a valid search
warrant, or exigent circumstances.")
150. Id. at 1093.
151. Id. at 1094.
152. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Only in
those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court
entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers.") (emphasis added).
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established guidelines" curbing the officer's discretion, the officer's
forced entry into the home in the middle of the night, and the
intrusive strip search were of particular concern to the Third
53
Circuit.'
2. The Ninth Circuit
The first case to address the application of the special needs
doctrine to child abuse investigations was Calabretta v. Floyd. Four
days after receiving an allegation of abuse, social worker Floyd
attempted to visit the Calabrettas' home. 154 Although Mrs. Calabretta
denied Floyd entrance into the home, Floyd was able to observe that
the children did not appear abused. 155 Two weeks later, Floyd
returned with a police officer, entered the home without consent,
interviewed the children, and ordered Mrs. Calabretta to remove the
1 56
youngest child's clothing for a strip search.
Much like the Third Circuit, the presence of a police officer
during the search and the location of the search in the child's home
immediately troubled the Ninth Circuit. 57 Specifically, the court
recognized that when there is a "criminal aspect to the investigation,"
the search moves beyond the realm of special needs and into the realm
of traditional law enforcement purposes. 58 The Ninth Circuit also
rejected the Second Circuit's broad interpretation of Wyman, holding
that the Wyman opinion turned on the issue of consent, not on a lower
expectation of privacy. 159 Finally, the Ninth Circuit held that T.L.O.'s
special needs test applies only to the special environment in schools
16 0
and not to children in general.
Nevertheless, the court considered whether the special needs
doctrine would apply to strip searches in child abuse cases. While the
court acknowledged the existence of the state's important interest in
protecting children, that interest "include[s] not only protection
against child abuse, but also 'the child's psychological well-being,
153. Good v. Dauphin Cnty. Soc. Servs. for Children & Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1096 (3d Cir.
1989).
154. Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808, 810 (9th Cir. 1999). The report stated that there was
shouting on other occasions, but did not provide specifics. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 811-12. Based on the record provided, the Court treated the entry in this case as
without consent. Id.
157. Id. at 813, 815.
158. Id. at 815.
159. Id. at 816.
160. Id.
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autonomy, and relationship to the family or caretaker setting' " and
their "interest in the privacy and dignity of their homes." 16 1 The Ninth
Circuit considered the interests of the child and the parents to be
substantially greater than the state's interests. 162 While the court
acknowledged that a three-year-old child's cognitive abilities do not
raise a great concern for the child's "privacy and dignity," it noted that
"there is a very substantial interest, which forcing the mother to pull
the child's pants down invaded, in the mother's dignity and authority
in relation to her own children in her own home."1 63 The forced entry
into the home, coupled with the parent's active participation in the
strip search, not only humiliated the parent in front of the child but
also undermined the parent's authority over her child in her own
home.1 64 Finally, the court recognized that the child and the parent
have an essential interest "in the privacy of their relationship with
1 65
each other."
If the state had hoped that Calabretta would be limited to
nonconsensual, in-home strip searches, Camreta v. Greene dashed that
hope. 66 In Camreta, investigators informed the Oregon Department of
Human Services that Nimrod Greene was having unsupervised
contact with his daughters K.G. and S.G., despite having recently
been released on child molestation charges. 167 Three days later,
caseworker Camreta interviewed S.G. at her school without notifying
her mother or obtaining a warrant.16 8 Camreta, with Deputy Sheriff
Alford in tow, interviewed S.G. in a private office at the elementary
69
school for over two hours.
The Ninth Circuit began by rejecting the argument that
Calabretta was limited to in-home investigations. 170 The court held
that T.L.O. should be limited only to searches and seizures conducted
by teachers and administrators in the school environment, in order to
"spare teachers and administrators the necessity of schooling
161. Id. at 820 (quoting Franz v. Lytle, 997 F.2d 784, 792-93 (10th Cir. 1993)).
162. See id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. While the opinion provides valuable insight into the opinion of the Ninth Circuit, the
opinion itself was vacated as moot by the Supreme Court last term. Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 202728.
167. Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d, 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated in part, 131 S. Ct.
2020 (2011).
168. Id. at 1016-17.
169. Id. at 1017.
170. Id. at 1023.
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themselves in the niceties of probable cause."' 171 Second, the court
found that the involvement of Deputy Sheriff Alford in the search
violated the special needs principle that the search be conducted
absent the "presence of law enforcement objectives." 172 Specifically, the
ongoing investigation of S.G.'s father, coupled with Oregon regulations
that require cooperation between social workers and law enforcement,
created significant entanglement between the objective of protecting
the general welfare of the child and the goal of obtaining evidence in a
criminal investigation. 73 As the court concluded, "At least where there
is ... direct involvement of law enforcement in an in-school seizure
and interrogation of a suspected child abuse victim, we simply cannot
say, as a matter of law, that she was seized for some 'special needf,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement.' "174
3. The Second Circuit
In Tenenbaum v. Williams, New York City caseworkers,
responding to a kindergarten teacher's report that her student Sarah
was abused, interviewed Sarah's parents and performed a partial
physical inspection of their children, which yielded no information
supporting the abuse allegation. 175 After an unsuccessful attempt to
interview Sarah at her school, caseworkers removed Sarah from her
classroom without a warrant and without parental consent and took
1 76
her to the hospital to test for sexual abuse.
The Second Circuit began its analysis by addressing the
competing interests of the parents, the child, and the state. The
Second Circuit conceded that the state had "a profound interest in the
welfare of the child."' 77 Nevertheless, the court recognized the
fundamental right of parents to raise their children free from the
intrusion of the state. 178 Despite these profound interests, however,
the court stated that "[w]hen child abuse is asserted, the child's
welfare predominates over other interests of her parents and the
State."'179 The court adopted the Tenth Circuit's rationale in Franz,

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 1024 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 343 (1985)).
Id. at 1027.
Id. at 1027-28.
Id. at 1030 (quotingFerguson, 532 U.S. at 74 n.7).
Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 588-89 (2d Cir. 1999).
Id. at 591.
Id. at 593-94.
Id. at 593 (citations omitted).
Id. at 595.
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that the multifaceted interests of the child include the interest to be
free from not only physical abuse but also unwarranted assaults from
the state against the child's "psychological well-being, autonomy, and
relationship to the family. '"180
Despite balancing the competing interests in this case, the
Second Circuit refused to apply the special needs doctrine. The court
found specific utility in requiring the state to seek judicial
authorization, which "makes a fundamental contribution to the proper
resolution of the tension among the interests of the child, the parents,
and the State. '18 1 However, because the court never definitively stated
whether the state is bound by special needs or traditional Fourth
Amendment standards, the amount of information required for a
grant of judicial authorization is not entirely clear. 8 2 Furthermore,
the court found that the state had both probable cause to believe that
Sarah was in danger and had satisfied the special needs
reasonableness test, thus making a definitive statement on the matter
irrelevant.183
4. The Fifth Circuit
In Roe v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory
Services, the Fifth Circuit became the last circuit to address the
special needs question, although it did not explicitly endorse a
position. In the summer of 1999, the Texas CPS agency received a tip
that Jackie Roe was acting inappropriately at a day camp, which was
viewed as a sign of physical abuse.1 8 4 CPS agent Woods visited
Jackie's home and, after discussing the matter with Jackie's mother,
asked Mrs. Roe to remove Jackie's clothes so that she could look for
18 5
bruises and photograph Jackie.

180. Id. (quoting Franz v. Lytle, 997 F.2d 784, 792-93 (10th Cir. 1993)).
181. Id. at 604.
182. See id. at 601-05 (declining to categorically decide whether the traditional or special
needs standard applies).
183. Id. at 604. The court also argued that because the case involved the safety of the child,
the exigent circumstances doctrine, which authorizes police to step in without probable cause or
a warrant if a person of reasonable caution would believe the individual is in imminent harm,
would justify the state's actions. Id. at 604-05.
184. Roe v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2002)
(where the report stated that Jackie was touching herself and other children, among other acts,

while naked).
185. Id. at 398-99. The photographs taken by Woods and Wood's requirement that Mrs. Roe
participate in the process are more probing than the above description provides. For a more
detailed description of the nude body inspection, see id.
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The Fifth Circuit, limiting its inquiry to the nude body search,
18 6
held that the special needs doctrine did not apply to strip searches.
To reach this conclusion, the court noted that while none of the
Supreme Court's special needs cases "involved strip searches or
nudity, the [C]ourt has long held that citizens have an especially
strong expectation of privacy in their homes." 18 7 Interestingly, despite
refusing to endorse a position on the issue of special needs, the Fifth
Circuit's opinion included the most detailed discussion of Supreme
Court special needs precedent.
The Fifth Circuit's opinion focused on three Supreme Court
cases, Wyman, Griffin, and Ferguson.Unlike the Ninth Circuit, which
explicitly rejected Wyman's applicability, the Fifth Circuit recognized
that the Court in Wyman applied a "general reasonableness test
rather than requiring a warrant and probable cause" in the home
searches of welfare recipients but held that this "general
reasonableness test" was dictum.18 8 The Fifth Circuit found Griffin to
be equally unsupportive of the state, as the special need in that case
was supported primarily because probationers "waive many of their
privacy rights and have a much lower subjective expectation of privacy
in the home." 18 9 The Fifth Circuit recognized that "[t]he court has
never upheld a 'special needs' search where the person's expectation of
privacy was as strong as Jackie's interest in bodily privacy." 190 Finally,
even if the search itself did not involve heightened privacy interests,
the entanglement of the Texas CPS agency regulations with law
enforcement undercuts the holding in Ferguson that special needs can
only be applied where the need is "divorced from the state's general
interest in law enforcement." 19 1
The wavering of the Second and Fifth Circuits has created a
considerable amount of confusion in the lower courts as to what
standard binds child abuse investigations, specifically those involving
forced home entries. 192 What will happen when the lower courts
186. Id. at 407-08. The court found that the initial entry into the home and interview were
consented to and thus were not subject to review. Id. at 401.
187. Id. at 404-05.
188. Id. at 405.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 406.
191. Id. (quoting Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79 (2001)).
192. See Martin v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 405 F. Supp. 2d 775, 791
(S.D. Tex. 2005) ("Because the Fifth Circuit has not chosen which standard to apply, this court
will analyze the record under both standards."); Pezzenti v. Capaldo, No. 3:03CV419(MRK), 2004
WL 2377241, at *4 (D. Conn. Sept. 23, 2004) ('The Second Circuit has declined to delineate the
precise analytical framework for determining when removal of a minor child 'of whom abuse is
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inevitably must decide a case where a search would be reasonable
under the special needs doctrine but would not be supported by
probable cause? While the circuits are concerned about the
intrusiveness of the search and the entanglement of law enforcement,
it is possible the circuits will rule in favor of special needs for less
intrusive home or school inspections by caseworkers who have no
involvement with the police. The confusion in the Second and Fifth
Circuits shows potential overlap between the seemingly split circuits.
C. The Seventh Circuit'sJurisdictionalAnalysis
Sixteen years after Darryl H., the Seventh Circuit backtracked
on the expansiveness of its decision by adding a jurisdictional element
in Doe v. Heck. For purposes of this Section, the term "jurisdiction"
and the phrase "jurisdictional element" refer to the geographic
location in which CPS performed a search. This Section does not use
them, as the courts commonly use them, to determine or limit the
realm of cases within a court's authority. Thus, the "jurisdictional
inquiry" added by the Seventh Circuit refers to the state's authority to
perform a search in a given arena.
In the fall of 1998, the Bureau of Milwaukee Child Welfare
("MCW") received reports that Troy Bond, the principal of Greendale
Academy, a private school, had spanked two students, including John
Doe Jr.193 MCW caseworkers traveled to Greendale Academy to
interview John Doe Jr. but did not contact the parents or the school
prior to the interview. 194 When Greendale Academy officials refused to
allow MCW to interview John Doe Jr. without a court order, the
caseworkers brought the police to force the school to allow the
interview.195
The Seventh Circuit began by noting the distinct difference
between searches conducted on private property and searches
conducted on public property. 96 "A warrantless search or seizure
conducted on private property is presumptively unreasonable"
97
regardless of whether the search was administrative or criminal.
The Seventh Circuit equated the rights of students in a private school
suspected' is justified."); Taylor v. Evans, 72 F. Supp. 2d 298, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("[I]t is unclear
under what circumstances a removal would violate the Fourth Amendment.").
193. Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 499-500, 502 (7th Cir. 2003).
194. Id. at 502.
195. Id. at 503.
196. Id. at 511 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474 (1971)).
197. Id. (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1978)).
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to the rights they have at home, because when parents enroll their
children in private schools, "the teachers and administrators ... stand
in loco parentis over the children entrusted to them." 198 While the
state did not ask for the special needs doctrine to apply, the Seventh
Circuit noted that the private/public distinction would have made the
argument baseless, because requiring some form of a warrant before a
private school search occurs preserves the constitutional rights of the
child, parents, and the private school. 199
In Michael C. v. Gresbach, caseworker Gresbach, armed with
an allegation that two students were abused by their parents, went to
the Good Hope Christian Academy ("Good Hope") to interview Ian and
his nine-year-old stepsister Alexis. 200 Good Hope Principal Reetz let
Gresbach interview the two children in private, believing the law
required her to do so. 20 1 Gresbach interviewed the children in
Principal Reetz's office before conducting a partial strip search of the
202
children.
In Gresbach, the Seventh Circuit expounded on the in loco
parentis argument it raised in Heck. Specifically, the court addressed
the argument the caseworker advanced, that she had the consent of
the private school principal. 20 3 The court disagreed, finding that
although the principal consented to the interviews, she at no time
authorized a physical body search. 20 4 Interestingly, the opinion seems
more grounded in the school's role in loco parentis than in the
subjective interests of privacy exhibited in the parents' choice to enroll
their children in private school. The Gresbach opinion implies that
had Principal Reetz consented to the physical examination as well, the
court would have likely found in favor of Gresbach, regardless of the
parents' heightened privacy interests. 205
IV. FINDING COMMON GROUND AND RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES

Between the complexity of the three competing interests of the
child, parents, and state in child abuse investigations and the "lack of
guidance from the Supreme Court," it is easy to understand why the
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 512 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654-55 (1995)).
Id. at 514.
Michael C. v. Gresbach, 526 F.3d 1008, 1011-12 (7th Cir. 2008).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1015.
Id. at 1015-16.
See id.
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special needs doctrine has created "confusion in the lower courts." 20 6
However, a close examination of the perceived circuit split produces a
different interpretation: that the circuits are not as divided as they
appear. In fact, by examining the similarities in the circuits' logic and
the factual differences presented in each case, this Part argues that
the circuits are united in their application of the special needs
doctrine.
This Part looks at how the courts handled each element of the
special needs doctrine. Section A examines the factual difference that
causes the primary divisions between the federal circuits: the role of
law enforcement in a search. Section B shows how the federal circuits
largely agree on the interests involved in the cases and that the
variations exist largely due to the intrusiveness of the search. Section
C examines how the location of the search creates variations between
cases with similarly intrusive searches. As this Part reveals, the
primary concern among all of the circuits is not whether special needs
applies to child abuse investigations but rather under what
will
satisfy the doctrine.
an investigation
circumstances
illustrates how
focus,
therefore,
primary
the
circuits'
Understanding
these opinions can be reconciled into a united approach, drawing from
shared legal principles.
A. Who Is Investigatingand How?
When CPS agents conduct the investigations alone, the circuits
have consistently applied the special needs doctrine. The first
principle of applying the special needs doctrine is to consider whether
the situation involves "exceptional circumstances in which special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant
and probable-cause requirement impracticable. ' 20 7 The circuits
applying the special needs doctrine focus on the difficulty of a child
abuse investigation and spend less time on the "normal need for law
enforcement." The circuits rejecting special needs focus almost
exclusively on the "normal need for law enforcement" and spend less
time on the difficulty of a child abuse investigation. The Seventh
Circuit lists the challenges of child abuse investigations, including: a
short time frame to remove a child from a dangerous home, a child's
inability to admit to the abuse, and that the only way to investigate an

206. Primus, supra note 38, at 300.
207. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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abuse case is through the victim and alleged perpetrator
themselves. 20 8 Statistics validate the court's concern that child abuse
victims will not be able to speak for themselves. In 2009, over threequarters of all child abuse victims were under the age of eleven, and
more than a third of all victims were under the age of four. 20 9 While
the Seventh Circuit realized that a successful child abuse
investigation would likely lead to criminal charges, that fact is
2 10
secondary to protecting the child.
Child abuse investigations are certainly difficult, supporting
the special needs circuits' position. However, CPS often conducts these
investigations with a strong reliance on local law enforcement or with
the purpose of reporting child abusers to the police. This supports the
rejecting circuits' position. As the Fifth Circuit noted, all of the special
needs circuits decided their cases prior to the Supreme Court's
guidance in Ferguson, which rejected the special needs doctrine when
the police are intimately involved. 2 11 When an officer arrives at the
scene, courts become less sympathetic to arguments that civil
investigators and teachers are not privy to the "niceties of probable
2 12
cause," because they are working with individuals who are.
The line becomes more difficult to see when, as was the case in
Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services, law
enforcement is not involved in the investigation but is a part of the
child abuse investigation regulations. 21 3 For example, the Fifth Circuit
referenced Texas laws that required social services caseworkers to
report all of their child investigation reports to police and to conduct
the investigations jointly.2 14 If the law merely required the caseworker
to inform the police of the investigation, would that be too much
entanglement with law enforcement? What if the caseworker merely
asked the police for evidence, records, and other information to
corroborate or dismiss an allegation but did not seek any further
assistance? While the dual purposes principle is an important element
of the special needs doctrine, the line between the two goals of a child
abuse investigation is still not clear.

208. Darryl H v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 902 (7th Cir. 1986).
209. CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 83, at 22.

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Darryl H., 801 F.2d at 902.
Roe v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 406 (5th Cir. 2002).
See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 343.
Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d at 406-07.
Id. at 407.
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Although this theoretical debate is fascinating, and the
uncertainty of where the Ferguson entanglement line is poses real
consequences, the circuits are in essence facing an entirely different
problem. While the Fifth Circuit correctly noted that the Fourth,
Seventh, and Tenth Circuits' special needs cases were decided prior to
Ferguson,215 none of these cases would have implicated Ferguson in
the first place. Specifically, none of these cases involved law
enforcement or had policies that required cooperation with law
enforcement. Darryl H. involved interviews and searches conducted
only by caseworkers in schools. 21 6 The same was true in Bagan.217 In
Wildauer, CPS conducted the searches at a foster home and involved
only caseworkers and nurses. 218 As further proof that these circuits
actually are aware of the rationale that the Supreme Court applied
later in Ferguson, the Tenth Circuit had previously rejected the
application of the special needs doctrine to searches relying on law
enforcement in Franz.21 9 That the Tenth Circuit did not overrule
220
Franz in Bagan bolsters the Franzexample.
Contrast those cases with the circuits rejecting the special
needs doctrine. In both Good and Calabretta,the caseworkers were
only allowed access to the homes as a result of the coercive presence of
an armed officer. 221 Camreta involved an interview conducted in the
presence of a deputy sheriff.222 The Ninth Circuit was "convinced that
law enforcement personnel and purposes were too deeply involved in
the seizure of S.G. to justify applying the 'special needs' doctrine." 223
Finally, in Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services,
while law enforcement was not directly involved, the fact that Texas
laws require social services caseworkers to conduct the investigations
jointly with law enforcement created a significant entanglement
224
problem consistent with the entanglement found in Ferguson.

215. Id. at 406.
216. Darryl H v. Coler., 801 F.2d 893, 895, 905 (7th Cir. 1986).
217. Doe v. Bagan, 41 F.3d 571, 574 (10th Cir. 1994).
218. Wildauer v. Frederick Cnty., 993 F.2d 369, 370-71 (4th Cir. 1993).
219. Franz v. Lytle, 997 F.2d 784, 791 (10th Cir. 1993).
220. See Bagan, 41 F.3d 571 (where the court did not overrule Franz).
221. Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808, 810 (9th Cir. 1999); Good v. Dauphin Cnty. Soc.
Servs. for Children & Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1089-90 (3d Cir. 1989).
222. Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated in part, 131 S. Ct. 2020
(2011).
223. Id. at 1027.

224. Roe v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 406-07 (5th Cir.
2002).
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B. CircuitAgreement over Individual Interest
More than the mere involvement of law enforcement
distinguishes these cases from one another. How the courts weigh the
interests involved furthers the perception of a circuit split. As a result,
the federal circuit division could be based less on how the courts weigh
the factors in the abstract and more on how the intrusiveness of the
search and/or seizure in a given case alters each interest's weight.
This Section, therefore, argues that the circuit divisions are likely the
product of the varying intrusiveness of the searches involved. This
Section demonstrates this by examining the interests of the child and
the parent separately.
1. The Child
Beginning at the broadest level, the Seventh Circuit in Darryl
H. recognized significant privacy and personal autonomy interests for
both the child and the parents on the one side and a compelling state
interest in protecting the welfare of the child on the other side. 225
Likewise, the Second Circuit in Tenenbaum recognized these same
competing interests and accorded them the same weight as the
interests in Darryl H. 226 Although both circuits found in favor of the
state, the Seventh Circuit believed that the state's interest was
greater than the child's and parents' interests, while the Second
Circuit held that "the child's welfare predominates over other
interests of her parents and the State."227 For the Second Circuit, this
meant that the child's interest included both a protection from abuse
and from the psychological and personal assaults that result from the
state's search.
One of the most troubling elements of the Second Circuit's
statement that the welfare of the child should triumph over the
interests of the state and the parent is that the state can seemingly
only apply the test ex post, but it must act ex ante. It is easy to
criticize the state for each investigation that turns out to be fruitless
and thus needlessly intrudes in the life of an innocent child, especially
given that more than three-quarters of child abuse investigations are
fruitless. 228 However, there are still 702,000 victims of child abuse

225.
226.
227.
228.

Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 901-902 (7th Cir. 1986).
Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 593-94 (2d Cir. 1999).
Id. at 595.
CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 83, at 8.
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each year. 229 From the state's perspective, every child not investigated
is another child, like Kessler Wilkinson, 230 who falls through the
cracks. One thing to consider, however, is whether the standard
Fourth Amendment justification should apply to child abuse
investigations. Courts commonly apply the exclusionary rule under
the belief that it is better that one criminal gets away with his crime if
it discourages the state from curbing societal liberty through unlawful
searches. However, should this same rationale apply when the cost of
upholding liberty is a child's injury or death?
Regardless of the ex post/ex ante conundrum raised above, the
rejecting circuits have all considered to some extent the physical wellbeing of the child as a factor both for the state and for the child in
balancing the interests. For example, all of the rejecting circuits
acknowledge the exigent circumstances exception when they weigh
the child's interest in the special needs analysis. 23 1 While it is an
entirely separate exception to the Fourth Amendment, the circuits'
reference to exigent circumstances demonstrates the difficulty of
considering the child's interest as either solely for or against the
232
state's interest.
The degree of the state's intrusion upon the child's privacy
rights may in fact be driving these circuits in their weighing of the
child's interest. Considering the degree of intrusion requires a factual
inquiry into the precise search measures the state took in a given case.
In both Bagan and Tenenbaum, cases that found no state violation of
the Fourth Amendment, a trained medical expert conducted the
challenged search in the privacy of a hospital room. 233 Likewise, in
Wildauer, the record shows that trained nurses limited their
examination of the children to investigating the children's "medical
229. Id. at 22.
230. See supranotes 1-6 and accompanying text.
231. See Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1027, 1030 n.17 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated in part,
131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011); Michael C. v. Gresbach, 526 F.3d 1008, 1018 (7th Cir. 2008); Doe v. Heck,
327 F.3d 492, 511 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75
(1971)); Roe v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 405 n.12 (5th Cir.
2002) (quoting Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 474-75); Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 604; Good v. Dauphin
Cnty. Soc. Servs. for Children & Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1092-93 (3d Cir. 1989); Darryl H. v.
Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 903 n.8 (7th Cir. 1986).
232. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 377-78 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (raising significant questions about how the seriousness of the infraction
should be evaluated in light of the special needs doctrine). This Note does not dismiss Justice
Stevens's concern. Rather, this Note suggests that the agreement between the circuits on how
serious child abuse is, specifically the state's interests in combating the problem, would likely
satisfy Justice Stevens's concern that special needs be reserved for major infractions.
233. Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 591; Doe v. Bagan, 41 F.3d 571, 574 (10th Cir. 1994).
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histories, medications, and schooling." 234 Thus, a primary motivating
factor for the courts' decisions is the increased dignitary value that
comes from who conducts the search and where and how it is
conducted. 235 While a strip search is intrusive, a judge is likely less
concerned when a doctor, trained to protect the victim's dignity,
conducts the search in a hospital. The dignitary value of a doctor's
examination is best seen when contrasted with Franz and Texas
Department of Protective and Regulatory Services. In both cases, an
armed police officer, who lacked specific training in how to properly
conduct a strip search, not only conducted the strip search but also
photographed the nude child. 236 Given the varying degrees of
intrusiveness a search of a child can have, it is easy to understand the
varying decisions among the circuits.
2. The Parents
Parental interests are more difficult to measure because they
may be both the guardian and possible suspect. While all of the
circuits seem to agree that the parents have a substantial interest in a
child abuse investigation, it is unclear how courts should view those
rights in light of the Supreme Court's special needs doctrine. There
are two ways of interpreting T.L.O.'s individual interest versus state
interest balancing test.2 3 7 One interpretation construes "individual"
broadly, requiring consideration of the interests of everyone
implicated in the investigation. The second interpretation construes
"individual" as limited solely to those searched.
Defining "individual" is crucial in examining the rights of the
parents in a search. Either view implicates the parents' interests in a
home search that penetrates the home environment, questions their
ability to raise their children, and undermines the parents' authority
in front of their children. The analysis changes when the court
considers school searches conducted outside the parents' presence,
where the parents' rights are more attenuated. As the Supreme Court
explained in Vernonia School District, "Today, of course, the fact that
a child's parents refuse to authorize a public school search of the child
234. Wildauer v. Frederick Cnty., 993 F.2d 369, 371 (4th Cir. 1993).
235. For a discussion of how the location of the search played a part in creating an
apparently divided court, see infra Part IV.C. (discussing the level of attention that the location
of a search should garner).
236. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d at 398; Franz v. Lytle, 997 F.2d
784, 785 (10th Cir. 1993).
237. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337.
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• . . is of little constitutional moment."238 Does that logic change in
child abuse investigations because the investigation implicates the
parents and begins to wander into the territory of family
management, which traditionally falls outside the boundaries of state
control? Or should the court consider parents' rights at all, given that
the parents' interests may directly conflict with the well-being of the
child? Or should the court apportion weight to the parents' interests
based on where the search occurs? The criticism of the Court's reliance
on balancing tests becomes clear in asking these questions, as the
weight of the parents' interests turns on "normative judgments rather
than objective conclusions about the merits of the evidence" based
almost entirely on "values-laden characterization[s]" of the parents'
23 9
interests.
Setting aside the jurisdictional approach of the Seventh Circuit
and its discussion of the parents' interest in a private school, the
nature of the search involved once again explains the circuit split. In a
narrow reading of T.L.O., one context in which the court could
consider the rights of the parents is when officials coerce the parents
into participating in the search of their child. It is true that parents
who hear that their child has been strip searched will certainly be
upset, if not furious. 240 However, parents will likely have an even
stronger reaction when they directly observe the strip search or, even
worse, when officials require the parents to help perform the strip
search. 241 In Calabretta,the Ninth Circuit specifically noted that the
mother's rights were substantially violated when the police "forc[ed]
the mother to pull the child's pants down," invading "the mother's
dignity and authority in relation to her own children in her own
242
home."
C. How the Location of the Search Explains the "Split"
The Supreme Court has been clear that a person's home is
entitled to greater protection than other locations. As the Court
explained in Boyd v. United States, the rigors of traditional Fourth
Amendment protection "appl[y] to all invasions on the part of the

238. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 681 n.1 (1995).
239. Coleman, supra note 6, at 531-32.
240. See Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 897, 906 (7th Cir. 1986).
241. See Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808, 811-12, 820 (9th Cir. 1999); Good v. Dauphin
Cnty. Soc. Servs. for Children & Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1090 (3rd Cir. 1989).
242. Calabretta,189 F.3d at 820.
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government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life."243 The Court reemphasized this point in Lawrence v.
Texas when it wrote, "Liberty protects the person from unwarranted
government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In our
tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home."244 While Lawrence
stood for the existence of liberty not confined to "spatial bounds," the
Court recognized strong and reasonable expectations of privacy within
the home. 245 It is, therefore, not surprising to see location play a
prominent role in the application of the special needs doctrine.
Given the prominence of location in each circuit's analysis, the
circuits are not divided but rather each circuit is merely giving the
appropriate attention to where the search occurred. Viewed less as an
ideological difference and more as a factor each circuit applies equally,
the picture of the current state of the special needs doctrine is one of
unity and not division. In those cases where the Seventh and Tenth
Circuits applied the special needs doctrine, officials performed the
search initially at a public school, with one instance followed up by a
hospital examination. 246 Even though the Second Circuit did not apply
the special needs doctrine, the court found in favor of the state when
the seizure happened at a public school and the examination occurred
at a hospital. 247 These cases thus stand in contrast with the Second
Circuit's rejection of the special needs doctrine where the searches
248
occurred primarily in the home.
When the court is asked to balance the interests of the state
and the individual, the analysis turns on the weight the court gives
each interest. Location plays a major role in determining how much
weight the court will give to a person's expectations of privacy. One
way of understanding this analysis is to consider the individual's
interests on a spectrum, in which the weight of the privacy interest is
based on the location where the act occurs. In order to weigh an
individual's privacy interests properly, the court must first identify
where on the privacy spectrum the individual's interest falls. On one

243. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
244. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
245. Id.
246. Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 897, 906 (7th Cir. 1986); see Doe v. Bagan, 41 F.3d 571,
574 (10th Cir. 1994).
247. Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 591 (2d Cir. 1999).
248. Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1999); Good v. Dauphin Cnty. Soc.
Servs. for Children & Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1090 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Franz v. Lytle, 997 F.2d
784, 789 (10th Cir. 1993). The situation in Franz could be compared to a parent placing a child
into a private school.
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side of the spectrum is complete privacy, while the other side of the
spectrum is complete exposure. The court could place every location on
the spectrum based on the level of privacy the location provides. The
closer a location approaches the privacy end of the spectrum, the
greater the weight the court should give the individual's interest. As
the location becomes more public, the weight accorded to the privacy
expectations dissipates (although, at least with regard to personal
searches and seizures, it never fully disappears). 249 So when the court
faces searches conducted in the home, a location close to the privacy
end of the spectrum, the court will heavily weigh an individual's
"strong expectation of privacy." 250 When the individual is in a public
school, the individual has "a lesser expectation of privacy," placing the
individual closer to the open exposure end of the spectrum. 251 That the
rejecting circuits held searches inside the home unconstitutional while
the applying circuits found public school searches reasonable is,
therefore, not an ideological difference but a difference in overall
weight of the interests as decided in part by location.
The Seventh Circuit's jurisdictional analysis provides an
interesting look into the geographic considerations utilized in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. In Heck, the Seventh Circuit treated the
student's right the same at home and at private school because "when
parents place minor children in private schools for their education,
'[school officials] stand in loco parentis over the children entrusted to
them.' "252 Parents expect, by enrolling in a private school, that their
249. See, e.g., Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 274 (2000) (recognizing that privacy rights are
diminished but not eliminated in public places like public schools and airports); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (recognizing that, although diminished, drivers of
automobiles still have some privacy interest in their cars); Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 347,
353 (1967) (recognizing privacy interests in a public phone booth).
250. Roe v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 404-05 (5th Cir.
2002); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 (noting that due process protects a party's liberty
interest, which includes protection from "unwanted intrusions" into the home).
251. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995). While few Justices and
scholars have gone as far to suggest it, we could place public schools on the extreme public end of
the privacy spectrum. For example, Justice Thomas suggests a return to the in loco parentis
rationale in support of authorizing most public school searches. Under Justice Thomas's
approach, a school is authorized to conduct the same types of searches that a parent can because,
through the process of school enrollment, the parent has voluntarily consented for a third party
(the school) to conduct the search. The parents, through school board elections, are free to limit
the school's authority. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2655-57 (2009).
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that placing public schools so far
down the "public" side of the spectrum helps meet matters of "great concern to teachers, parents,
and students").
252. Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 522 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist, 515 U.S. at
654-55).
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choice to remove their children from the supervision of the
government will be respected and that their children will be protected
253
from unwarranted government intrusions.
Although the Seventh Circuit's argument is logical, this in loco
parentis rationale creates three significant problems. First, it allows
abusive parents to hinder a state investigation by placing their
children in private schools. 254 This result directly contradicts the
Second Circuit's statement that "[w]hen child abuse is asserted, the
child's welfare predominates over other interests of her parents and
the State."255 Second, the distinction between public and private
schools fails under a limited reading of T.L.O., as the parents'
subjective interest in an in-school search may be "of little
constitutional moment." 256 Finally, the Seventh Circuit's publicprivate distinction creates an odd paradox: the government can more
freely infringe upon the parents' rights when they place their children
in the control of individuals bound by the Fourth Amendment. In
T.L.O., the Supreme Court specifically recognized that, although
school searches are subject to the more lenient special needs doctrine,
public school students nevertheless have a Fourth Amendment right
against unreasonable searches and seizures.2 5 7 The Seventh Circuit
approach in Heck thus affords less protection to the rights of parents
and children in public schools, where officials are bound by the Fourth
Amendment, than it affords those attending private schools, where the
teachers are free from constitutional confines.
While the Seventh Circuit's distinction between public and
private schools may create some problems, the focus on these
geographic considerations shows that the Seventh Circuit might not
be an entirely separate circuit split at all. While the Ninth Circuit in
Camreta classified the Seventh Circuit's jurisdictional analysis as a
third fissure in the "circuit split,"258 the Seventh Circuit was not
creating a new doctrine but rather applying the location analysis upon

253. Id. at 523.
254. This threat is somewhat mitigated if the Seventh Circuit's in loco parentis rationale in
Gresbach authorizes a private school to consent to a full investigation of its students inside the
school. 526 F.3d 1008, 1015-16 (7th Cir. 2008).
255. Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 595 (2d Cir. 1999). See also Darryl H. v. Coler,
801 F.2d 893, 902 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that the state's interest in preventing child abuse is
"extraordinarily weighty").
256. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 681 n.1 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
257. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334 (1985).
258. Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1026 n.11 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Gresbach, 526 F.3d
at 1015).
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which the other circuits have always relied. 259 The Seventh Circuit's
jurisdictional analysis only looks different because it was the only
court asked to consider where on the spectrum a private school falls.
Therefore, because the privacy interest in a private school was not as
clear-cut as the interest in a home or public school, the Seventh
Circuit had to examine the privacy expectations a child holds inside a
private school, determine where on the spectrum private schools fall,
and then weigh accordingly.
V. CREATING A UNIFIED APPROACH

The opinions of the circuits can be reconciled under a fourprong balancing test. These four elements include: where the child is
searched or seized, the nature of the search or seizure, the degree of
law enforcement involvement, and the stringency of the regulations
curbing the discretion of the individual performing the search or
seizure. Clearly defining the elements of the test allows the state to
fulfill its duty to protect its children from child abuse without fear
that the agency is exceeding the limits of its authority.
A. Location
Clearly defining the special needs doctrine provides state CPS
agencies with a necessary tool to use in searches in public. Consider
the location element. It is easy to see how the state is left with little
policy guidance on the limits of its authority. When a federal circuit
rules narrowly on the applicability of the special needs doctrine in one
home-search case, the circuit appears to rule against the doctrine's
applicability in all child abuse investigations. This shuts off an entire
avenue through which the state can help combat child abuse.
Likewise, when the Fourth Circuit states that the special needs
doctrine applies to a foster care search, an area where the rights of the
guardian are considerably lower, it fails to provide a ceiling for just
how far the special needs doctrine extends. As a result, the state is
still left searching for the constitutional guidelines by which it can
make appropriate policy choices.
To correct this, the circuits should clearly define the spatial
boundaries within which the special needs doctrine applies. The courts
should treat searches made inside the home differently than searches
made elsewhere. The courts should and likely will continue only to
259. Doe v. Bagan, 41 F.3d 571, 574 (10th Cir. 1994); DarrylH., 801 F.2d at 897, 906.
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allow in-home searches and seizures based on exigent circumstances,
a doctrine entirely separate from the special needs doctrine. Absent
exigent circumstances, the court should generally require a warrant
and probable cause for nonconsensual in-home investigations.
The location element is necessary to consider not only because
of the element's ties to personal privacy and the subjective
expectations that exist within the home but also because of the
heightened interests of the parents in the search. 260 Unlike the school
setting, where the parents are often not present, in-home searches and
seizures often require parental participation. 261 For example, in
Calabretta, the court recognized that the officer ordering Mrs.
Calabretta to participate in the strip search humiliated her in front of
her children. 2 62 But even if the parents are not forced to participate in
the search, the very presence of the state in their home has
considerable consequences. Because parents are often powerless to
prevent the search once the state invades the home, the state
inevitably undermines the parents' authority over their home,
especially in front of their children. While parents may feel their
authority is similarly undermined when the search is conducted on
school grounds, by placing their children in school, the parents
temporarily cede some of their authority over their children while the
children engage in school activities.
While the rejecting circuits' special needs analysis appears to
reject the doctrine's applicability in general, all these courts have
really found is that the state, in conducting an in-home search, has
failed to meet the demands of the special needs doctrine. Otherwise,
the circuits would not have spent the time fleshing out the interests of
the parents and the child in the investigation itself. Viewing the cases
in this light, it is easier to understand the rejecting circuits' logic.
Although these circuits acknowledge that the state has a considerable
interest, once the state enters the home, the child's and parents'
interests increase in weight considerably and outweigh the state's
interest. While in a public school, the child's right to personal
autonomy is certainly high; in the home, that interest exists alongside
the child's right to feel safe and secure in her home. Given the
heightened rights of the parents and child inside the home, it is hard

260. See supranotes 187-90, 196-99 and accompanying text.
261. See Roe v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 399 (5th Cir.
2002); Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1999); Good v. Dauphin Cnty. Soc.
Servs. for Children & Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1089-90 (3d Cir. 1989).
262. Calabretta,189 F.3d at 820.
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to imagine a circumstance, outside of exigent circumstances, where
the state's interest will ever rise above the heightened parent-child
interests under a proper special needs analysis.
The same should be true in private schools. A private school's
in loco parentis authority over its students is a compelling factor in
this scenario because, as the Seventh Circuit recognized, by placing
their children in a private school, parents expect that the state will
respect their choice to remove their children from the supervision of
the government and their children will be protected from unwarranted
government intrusions. 263 By interfering with the private school, the
state is interfering with the parents' choice, thereby implicating a
higher level of individual rights that the state must overcome. The
role private schools play in the special needs doctrine could potentially
raise a true circuit split in the future, primarily because it is not clear
whether the other federal circuits will weigh the individual privacy
interests that exist in private schools as heavily as the Seventh
Circuit.
B. Intrusiveness of the Investigation
The second prong of the analysis should focus on the
intrusiveness of the search or seizure. When balancing the rights of
the individual against the interest of the state, courts should view the
weight accorded to the rights of the individuals in light of the
intrusiveness of the government's investigation and the information
on which the government bases its suspicion. This prong will
inevitably require the most consideration from the courts.
Understanding how the courts can apply this prong requires a return
to the spectrum discussion in Part IV.C.
Imagine once again a spectrum, only this time the spectrum
goes from the least intrusive act to the most intrusive act. All along
the spectrum, one can place different investigatory procedures. The
spectrum ranges from interviewing the child, as in Bagan,264 to stripsearching, touching, and photographing the naked child, as in Texas
Department of Protective and Regulatory Services.265 As the
investigatory technique moves further to the intrusive end of the

263. Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 512 (7th Cir. 2003).
264. Doe v. Bagan, 41 F.3d 571, 574 (10th Cir. 1994).
265. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d at 398 (where the report stated
that authorities were alerted of potential abuse when notified that the child was touching herself
and other children, among other acts, while naked).
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spectrum, the interests of the child and the parents become
heightened and therefore deserve greater weight. As a result, the
state's interest must be significantly higher to perform a strip search
than it would be to ask a child a few questions. The state could
demonstrate this heightened state interest through a short time
window or highly credible evidence supporting the allegation. Since
the test turns on the reasonableness of the search, a highly intrusive
action requires considerable support in order for a court to find it
reasonable.
Standard strip searches are the most difficult to place on the
spectrum and have been where the greatest variations among the
circuits exist. However, once again, it appears the circuits have begun
the process of identifying the appropriate weight to give the
individuals' privacy interest in the context of a strip search. Returning
to the discussion in Part IV.B.1, when weighing the interests of the
child, a judge is likely less concerned about a strip search when it is
performed in a hospital by a doctor who is trained to protect the
victim's dignity than when it is performed by a police officer, who may
not have the requisite training or experience to minimize the trauma
of the search. 266 The question then becomes: what about CPS agents
and social workers? The courts should consider the training of the
agent in conducting a strip search and the method employed by the
agent. The more training and experience a caseworker has in
conducting a strip search, the better prepared the caseworker is to
conduct a strip search that will protect the child's dignity as best as
the caseworker can.
The courts should also consider the information that prompted
the CPS investigation. Given the requirement in Redding that highly
intrusive searches require high state interests and a link between the
suspicion and the specific intrusive search, 267 the courts should only
allow strip searches when the search is specifically supported by
credible information. This can also help limit the discretion of the CPS
agent. For example, if an agent has several reports from family and
neighbors that a child has been hit in the chest, the agent would have
credible information to perform a partial strip search of the chest
region, where the evidence specifically points, but would not be able to
search any further. In Bagan, the CPS agent had specific evidence
that the victim tested positive for chlamydia. 268 That information was
266. Id. at 398; Franz v. Lytle, 997 F.2d 784, 785-86 (10th Cir. 1993).
267. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2642-43 (2009).
268. Bagan, 41 F.3d at 574.
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both highly credible and specifically linked to the search requested by
the CPS agent, a medical test for chlamydia. While Bagan was not a
pure strip search case and while medical testing is viewed as less
intrusive than CPS strip searches, the example shows that the lower
courts can easily apply the Redding test to several different search
and seizure techniques employed by the state.
One area that none of the circuits have fully taken into
consideration is how the age of the child searched should factor into a
special needs analysis. The Court in T.L.O. argued that when
measuring the intrusiveness of the search, it must be viewed "in light
of the age and sex" of the child. 269 Only the Ninth Circuit took age into
partial consideration, recognizing that a three-year-old child would
not appreciate the full affront of a nude search to an individual's
personal dignity and autonomy. 270 The Supreme Court and the lower
courts, however, have not specified what role age plays in the
consideration.2 7 1 As Professor Steven Shatz observed, "It should be
obvious that, in determining under what circumstances a strip search
is permissible, whether the child is two or seven or seventeen is
relevant."272 Professor Shatz continued to note:
The general characteristics of cognitive and moral growth associated with these stages,
and relevant to the Fourth Amendment inquiry, are as follows ....In terms of morality,
young children are unable to operate by general rules, and their judgment is dominated
by "moral realism," an unquestioning response to demands of authority figures. School
age children . . . [do not] derive their morality from adult demands, but rather, their
morality finds its basis in social reciprocity. Adolescents . . .have progressed from a
morality based on strict adherence to societal rules of equality to a mature morality
2 73
based on internalized principles of justice.

What Professor Shatz illustrates, and what the Ninth Circuit
acknowledged, is that in determining the standard of reasonableness
of a strip search, the courts must consider the psychological
differences between a three-year-old, a seven-year-old, and a teenager.
This is based not only on their ability to speak for themselves but also
on the long-term psychological and personal dignity repercussions that
come with strip searches.
Despite the areas that still need to be further developed by the
Court, the federal circuits are, much as with the first prong, already

269. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985).
270. Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808, 820 (9th Cir. 1999).
271. Steven Shatz et al., The Strip Search of Children and the FourthAmendment, 26 U.S.F.
L. REV. 1, 14 (1991).
272. Id.
273. Id. at 15-16.
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impliedly applying this test. With the exception of Camreta, the prior
cases demonstrate that the least intrusive searches (interviews, for
example) will largely survive under special needs, while the most
intrusive searches (photographed strip searches) will rarely, if ever,
pass constitutional muster. The fact that many of the circuits agree
with one another about the rights implicated in certain types of
searches (specifically strip searches) and about the problems facing
CPS agencies mitigates the confusion caused by the term "circuit
split." Thus, if the circuits were to adopt a unified approach based on
the previous opinions across the circuits, the state would have a
complete picture as to how the courts will view certain types of
searches and seizures. As a result, the state would be adequately on
notice about the individual interests implicated and thus adequately
informed so as to make the appropriate policy choice on how to best
conduct child abuse investigations in the future.
C. The Role of Law Enforcement
The third prong should focus on the involvement of law
enforcement. On this point, I agree with the Ninth Circuit that police
officers should not be involved in conducting the search or seizure.
Likewise, any requirement, like those implemented in Texas, that
mandates an investigation of child abuse to be performed jointly with
a criminal investigation should not be accorded special needs
protections, based on the dual-purposes concern laid out in Ferguson.
However, merely forwarding a case file to the police or working with
the police on background information in support of the investigation
should not implicate the dual-purposes trigger in Ferguson-aslong
as the police are not involved in the search itself.
The Ninth Circuit's recognition of the involvement of law
enforcement illustrated an important reason why clarifying the
current state of the law is necessary. In recognizing that Oregon laws
require joint coordination between CPS and law enforcement, the
Ninth Circuit was quick to point out:
We do not mean to express any negative judgment concerning the wisdom of Oregon's
policy. It may well be that fostering coordination and collaboration between caseworkers
and law enforcement officers is an effective way both to protect children and to arrest
and prosecute child abusers-each, of course, governmental activity of the highest
importance. But we do hold that state officials using such a policy cannot thereby forge

2012]

THE MONSTER UNDER THE BED

an exception to traditional Fourth Amendment protections for the criminal investigation
274
of child sexual abuse, as they seek to do here.

What the Ninth Circuit recognizes is that the choice for how to
proceed in conducting child abuse investigations must be left to the
275
state.
However, a clear statement from the courts, that the
involvement of law enforcement would be a dispositive factor in the
special needs analysis, would give the state the opportunity to weigh
the cost of involving the police appropriately. The state, like the Ninth
Circuit recognized, can determine for itself if the benefits of working
with law enforcement outweigh the costs of having to follow the
traditional Fourth Amendment requirements. Allowing an imaginary
circuit split to continue to exist only inhibits the state's ability to make
that policy decision. Consider the variation already existing within the
courts. The Seventh Circuit argues that a tightly constructed policy
limiting the discretion of the caseworker is sufficient, while the Fifth
Circuit states that the involvement of a concurrent criminal
investigation bars special needs, while the Second Circuit refuses to
define what case would or would not fit into the special needs doctrine.
The only circuit that has attempted to define its special needs
doctrinal position clearly is the Tenth Circuit, by establishing a clear
line between Franz and Bagan. But even the Tenth Circuit could
experience the uncertainty that is created in cases, like Texas
Department of Protective and Regulatory Services, where the
entanglement is not as clearly defined as the involvement in Ferguson
276
or Franz.

274. Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1029 (9th Cir. 2009).
275. That is not to say that the state can define the constitutional limitations. To hold that
position would run counter to the Supreme Court's position that constitutional rights do not turn
on the reasonable beliefs of third parties. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 441 (2007) ("To
the extent the Court defers to the principal's ostensibly reasonable judgment, it abdicates its
constitutional responsibility. The beliefs of third parties, reasonable or otherwise, have never
dictated ... ").
276. Compare Roe v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 407 (5th Cir.
2002) (where the search was conducted without a police officer but where 'Texas law compels
social workers to investigate allegations of sexual abuse" as well as requiring CPS to "deeply
involve law enforcement in the investigation. CPS has a duty to notify law enforcement of any
child abuse reports it receives."), with Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 72 (2001)
(where hospitals were authorized to use "the threat of law enforcement intervention" to coerce
patients into drug treatment, which the state admitted was "necessary"), and Franz v. Lytle, 997
F.2d 784, 785 (10th Cir. 1993) (where a police officer, not a social worker, conducted the search in
question).
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D. CPS Regulations
The final prong considers whether a state has specific
guidelines limiting the discretion of the caseworker. These guidelines
should recommend corroboration of allegations, where feasible, before
any investigation of the child's person begins. The policy should also
spell out specifically what constitutes an actionable allegation to
prevent anonymous sources from triggering intrusive searches.
This prong is consistent with Dewey. There the Court held a
warrantless search constitutional on the basis that the regulations
were sufficiently strict so as to deny unbridled discretion to the
inspector, thus serving as a "constitutionally adequate substitute for a
warrant." 277 Similar to the intrusiveness prong discussed above, this
prong will also ease the courts' concern that the government's action
needlessly intrudes on the privacy and dignity of the child and the
parents. Finally, having a clearly delineated policy makes it easier for
the courts to evaluate the state's interest. If the regulations require
corroboration of the allegation or a prior investigation before the agent
can act, the agent would be able to provide more facts to bolster the
state's interest in conducting the search.
While stringent regulations that prevent needlessly intrusive
searches are certainly ideal, it is hard for the state to meet this goal
when the circuits claim to be in disagreement with one another. This
is essentially the reason why the term "circuit split" is so dangerous to
CPS agencies. Child abuse is a large and pressing concern in the
United States. It also poses several logistical nightmares that inhibit
the states' ability to protect their children. 278 The circuits, by claiming
to be divided on the basis of one or two circuit opinions, are leaving
the states with an uncertain legal doctrine, inhibiting their ability to
develop a clear system to combat child abuse. How can the courts
expect a state to create a system that limits its agents' discretion but
allows them the ability to conduct a quick and accurate investigation
when the circuits fail to provide a clear definition of the state's
boundaries?
By recognizing that the circuits are not divided, but rather that
their opinions represent a consistent body of case law, the states are
provided with a full range of cases on which they can base their
policies. By viewing the circuits' decisions as one comprehensive body,
the states can see both the upper and lower limits of their authority.
277. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603 (1981).
278. See supra Parts III and IV.
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For example, if we looked at the cases collectively, the states would be
aware that photographed strip searches, in-home searches, and
searches involving police officers would likely require a warrant.
Likewise, the states would also know that their agents could search
foster care homes, conduct public school interviews, and authorize
hospital examinations without warrants. By viewing these cases
collectively, the states can weigh for themselves whether the
decreased Fourth Amendment requirements are worth the cost of not
involving law enforcement.
Whether the states decide to involve the police or conduct an
in-home search is not important; rather, what is important is that the
decision on how best to conduct an investigation be left to the states.
That is not to say that the states should be entitled to complete
discretion in this area. As previously stated, the interest should
always be, primarily, in what is in the best interest of the child.
However, it is often state CPS agencies, with their years of experience
handling child abuse investigations, that are in the best position to
know how best to conduct an investigation. A CPS agency might, in
weighing the costs and benefits, determine that the assistance of the
police is more valuable than the added cost of seeking a warrant.
Likewise, the agency might find that a warrant would unduly hinder
the speed of the investigation and thus limit its investigations to
school interviews and medical examinations. In order for the states to
make coherent policy decisions and weigh the costs discussed above,
the states must have detailed information about what the Fourth
Amendment requires from the states. With this complete test,
examining search locations, intrusiveness, government discretion, and
law enforcement involvement, the states would finally have the
necessary information to establish comprehensive policies that will
effectively reduce the necessary evils that come with child abuse
investigations.
VI. CONCLUSION

The stories of Kessler and Jochebed, as detailed in Part I,
should serve as reminders of problems plaguing current child abuse
investigations and of the traumatic consequences often borne by our
nation's youngest citizens. While all of the involved actors-the state,
the parents, and the child-have substantial competing interests, the
difficulty of the issue should not prevent us from creating a
comprehensive system through which our social services caseworkers
can operate. The Second Circuit is correct that "[w]hen child abuse is
asserted, the child's welfare predominates over other interests of her
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parents and the State."279 However, upholding the Second Circuit's
ideal is far from easy, as demonstrated by the confusion amongst the
circuits.
Upon closer examination, however, the circuit courts'
approaches are not as divergent as they initially appear. By taking
into account the concerns of each circuit, this Note advocates that the
circuits recognize a unified, four-pronged balancing test developed
from the diverging circuit opinions. This modified approach considers
the location and nature of the search, the personnel conducting the
search, and the regulations restricting government discretion. It is
only by seeing both sides of the issue that we can appreciate how
complicated the child abuse dilemma is and how close together the
circuits are to one another. By curbing government discretion in all
cases but providing states with a mechanism to conduct efficient child
abuse investigations, events like those surrounding Kessler and
Jochebed will occur less frequently. But this world can only exist when
we realize the circuit split does not exist. By exposing the nightmare
circuit split as an illusion and by eliminating the uncertainty our CPS
agencies currently face, we are able to wake up to a safer reality.
Adam Pig*
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